Dynamics of probabilistic labor markets: statistical physics perspective by Chen, He & Inoue, Jun-ichi
ar
X
iv
:1
30
9.
51
58
v1
  [
q-
fin
.G
N]
  2
0 S
ep
 20
13
Dynamics of probabilistic labor markets:
statistical physics perspective
He Chen and Jun-ichi Inoue
Abstract We introduce a toy probabilistic model to analyze job-matching processes
in recent Japanese labor markets for university graduates by means of statistical
physics. We show that the aggregation probability of each company is rewritten
by means of non-linear map under several conditions. Mathematical treatment of
the map enables us to discuss the condition on which the rankings of arbitrary two
companies are reversed during the dynamics. The so-called ‘mismatch’ between
students and companies is discussed from both empirical and theoretical viewpoints.
1 Introduction
Deterioration of the employment rate is now one of the most serious problems in
Japan [1, 2, 3]and various attempts to overcome these difficulties have been done
by central or local governments. Especially, in recent Japan, the employment rate
in young generation such as university graduates is getting worse. To consider the
effective policy and to carry out it for sweeping away the unemployment uncertainty,
it seems that we should simulate artificial labor markets in computers to reveal the
essential features of the problem. In fact, in macroeconomics (labor science), there
exist a lot of effective attempts to discuss the macroscopic properties [4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9] including so-called search theory [10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. However, apparently,
the macroscopic approaches lack of their microscopic viewpoint, namely, in their
arguments, the behaviour of microscopic agents such as job seekers or companies
are neglected.
Taking this fact in mind, in our preliminary studies [15, 16], we proposed a sim-
ple probabilistic model based on the concept of statistical mechanics for stochastic
labor markets, in particular, Japanese labor markets for university graduates. In these
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papers [15, 16], we showed that a phase transition takes place in macroscopic quan-
tities such as unemployment rate as the degree of high ranking preferential factor
increases. These results are obtained at the equilibrium state of the labor market,
however, the dynamical aspect seems to be important to reveal the matching pro-
cess between the students and companies. Hence, in this paper, we shall focus on
the dynamical aspect of our probabilistic labor market.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce our probabilistic
model according to the references [15, 16]. In the next section 3, we show the ag-
gregation probability of each company is described by a non-linear map. Using the
knowledge obtained from the non-linear map, we discuss the condition on which the
ranking of arbitrary two companies is reversed in successive two business years in
section 4, In section 5, we discuss the global mismatch measurement, namely, ratio
of job supply. We compare the result with the empirical evidence in recent Japan.
In section 6, we introduce a simple procedure to derive the analytic form of the ag-
gregation probability at the steady state by means of ‘high-temperature expansion’.
The last section 7 is summary.
2 Model systems
According to our preliminary studies [15, 16], we shall assume that the following
four points (i)-(iv) should be taken into account to construct the our labor markets.
(i) Each company recruits constant numbers of students in each business year.
(ii) If the company takes too much or too less applications which are far beyond or
far below the quota, the ability of the company to gather students in the next
business year decreases.
(iii) Each company is apparently ranked according to various perspectives. The rank-
ing information is available for all students.
(iv) A diversity of making decision of students should be taken into account by means
of maximization of Shannon’s entropy under some constraints.
To construct labor markets by considering the above four essential points, let us
define the total number of companies as K and each of them is distinguished by
the label: k = 1,2, · · · ,K. Then, the number of the quota of the company k is spec-
ified by v∗k . In this paper, we shall fix the value v∗k and regard the quota as a ‘time-
independent’ variable. Hence, the total quota (total job vacancy in society) in each
business year V is now given by
V =
K
∑
k=1
v∗k . (1)
When we define the number of students by N (each of the students is explicitly
specified by the index i as i = 1,2, · · · ,N), one assumes that the V is proportional
to N as V = αN, where α stands for job offer ratio and is independent of V and N.
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Apparently, for α =V/N > 1, that is V > N, the labor market behaves as a ‘seller’s
market’, whereas for α < 1, the market becomes a ‘buyer’s market’.
We next define a sort of ‘energy function’ for each company which represents the
ability (power) of gathering applicants in each business year t. The energy function
is a nice bridge to link the labor market to physics. We shall first define the local
mismatch measurement: hk(t) for each company k (k = 1,2, · · · ,K) as
hk(t) =
1
V
|v∗k − vk(t)|=
1
αN
|v∗k − vk(t)|, (2)
where vk(t) denotes the number of students who seek for the position in the company
k at the business year t (they will post their own ‘entry sheet (CV)’ to the company
k). Hence, the local mismatch measurement hk(t) is the difference between the num-
ber of applicants vk(t) and the quota v∗k . We should keep in mind that from the fact
(i) mentioned before, the v∗k is a business year t-independent constant.
On the other hand, we define the ranking of the company k by εk(> 1) which is
independent of the business year t. Here we assume that the ranking of the company
k is higher if the value of εk is larger. In this paper, we simply set the value as
εk = 1+
k
K
. (3)
Namely, the company k = K is the highest ranking company and the company k = 1
is the lowest. Then, we define the energy function of our labor market for each
company k as
E(εk,hk;t)≡−γ logεk +
τ
∑
l=1
βlhk(t− l). (4)
From the first term appearing in the right hand side of the above energy function
(4), students tend to apply their entry sheets to relatively high ranking companies.
However, the second term in (4) acts as the ‘negative feedback’ on the first ranking
preference to decrease the probability at the next business year t+1 for the relatively
high ranking company gathering the applicants at the previous business year t. Thus,
the second term is actually regarded as a negative feedback on the first term. The
ratio γ/βl , (l = 1, · · · ,τ) determines to what extent students take into account the
history of the labor market. In this paper, we simply set β1 = β ,β2 = · · · = βτ = 0,
namely, we assume that each student consider the latest result in the market history.
We next adopt the assumption (iv). In order to quantify the diversity of making
decision by students, we introduce the following Shannon’s entropy:
H =−
K
∑
k=1
Pk(t) logPk(t) (5)
Then, let us consider the probability Pk(t) that maximizes the above H under the
normalization constraint ∑Kk=1 Pk(t) = 1. To find such Pk(t), we maximize the func-
tional f with Lagrange multiplier λ , f =−∑Kk=1 Pk(t) logPk(t)+λ{∑Kk=1 Pk(t)−1},
with respect to Pk(t). A simple algebra gives the solution
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Pk(t) =
1
K
. (6)
This implies that the most diverse making decision by students is realized by a
random selection from among K companies with probability 1/K. (It should be
noted that we set Keλ−1 = 1).
On the analogy of the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution in statistical mechanics,
we add an extra constraint in such a way that the expectation of energy func-
tion over the probability Pk(t) is constant for each business year t, namely, E =
∑Kk=1 Pk(t)E(εk,hk;t). Taking into account this constraint by means of another La-
grange multiplier λ ′ and maximizing the functional
f = −
K
∑
k=1
Pk(t) logPk(t)+λ
{
K
∑
k=1
Pk(t)− 1
}
+λ ′
{
E =
K
∑
k=1
Pk(t)E(εk,hk;t)
}
(7)
with respect to Pk(t), we have the probability Pk(t) that the company k gathers their
applicants at time t as
Pk(t) =
exp [−E(εk,hk(t− 1))]
Z
, E(εk,hk(t− 1))≡−γ logεk +β hk(t− 1) (8)
where we defined Z ≡∑Kk=1 exp[−E(εk,hk(t−1))] stands for the normalization con-
stant for the probability. The parameters γ and β specify the probability from the
macroscopic point of view. Namely, the company k having relatively small hk(t) can
gather a lot of applicants in the next business year and the ability is controlled by
β (we used the assumption (ii)). On the other hand, the high ranked company can
gather lots of applicants and the degree of the ability is specified by γ (we used the
assumption (iii)).
We should notice that for the probability Pk(t), each student i decides to post their
entry sheet to the company k at time t as
aik(t) =
{
1 (with Pk(t))
0 (with 1−Pk(t))
(9)
where aik(t) = 1 means that the student i posts his/her entry sheet to the company k
and aik(t) = 0 denotes that he/she does not.
We might consider the simplest case in which each student i posts their single
entry sheet to a company with probability Pk(t). Namely, Pk(t) is independent of
i. From the definition, the company k gets the entry sheets NPk(t) on average and
the total number of entry sheets is N ∑Kk=1 Pk(t) = N. This means that each student
applies only once on average to one of the K companies. We can easily extend
this situation by assuming that each student posts his/her entry sheets a-times on
average. In this sense, the situation changes in such a way that the company k takes
aNPk(t)-entry sheets on average.
Now it is possible for us to evaluate how many acceptances are obtained by a
student and let us define the number by si(t) for each student i = 1, · · · ,N. Then,
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we should notice that the number of acceptances for the student i is defined by
si(t) = ∑Kk=1 sik(t) with
P(sik(t) = 1|aik(t)) =Θ(v∗k − vk(t))δaik(t),1 +
v∗k
v∗k(t)
Θ(vk(t)− v∗k)δaik(t),1 (10)
and P(sik(t) = 0|aik(t)) = 1−P(sik(t) = 1|aik(t)), where Θ(· · ·) denotes the conven-
tional step function and one should remember that we defined new variables aik(t)
which give aik(t) = 1 when the labor i posts the entry sheet to the company k and
aik(t) = 0 vice versa. Thus, the first term of (10) means that the sik(t) takes 1 with
unit probability when the labor i posts the sheet to the company k and the total num-
ber of sheets gathered by the company k does not exceed the quota v∗k . On the other
hand, the second term means that the sik(t) takes 1 with probability v∗k/vk(t) even if
vk(t)> v∗k holds. In other words, for vk(t)> v∗k , the informally accepted v∗k students
are randomly selected from vk(t) candidates.
The probability (8) describes the microscopic foundation of our labor markets.
In the next section, we show that the update rule of the probability Pk(t) is regarded
as a non-linear map in the limit of N → ∞.
3 Non-linear map for the aggregation probability
In this section, we derive a non-linear map for the aggregation probability Pk(t).
Under the simple assumption v∗k(= const.), we have V = ∑Kk=1 v∗k = Kv∗k . On the
other hand, from the definition of job offer ratio V = αN, β v∗k/V = β/K and
(β/V )vk(t−1) = (β/α)(vk(t−1)/N) = (β/α)Pk(t−1) should be satisfied. When
NPk,NPk(1−Pk) are large enough, the binomial distribution of vk(t), that is, P(vk) =
NCvk P
vk
k (1−Pk)
N−vk could be approximated by a normal distribution with mean NPk
and variance NPk(1−Pk). Namely,
vk(t) = NPk +
√
NPk(1−Pk)N (0,1). (11)
This reads vk(t)/N = Pk +
√
Pk(1−Pk)/NN (0,1) and the second term can be
dropped in the limit N → ∞ as limN→∞ vk(t)/N = Pk(t). Thus the probability Pk(t)
is now rewritten by
Pk(t) =
exp
[
γ log
(
1+ kK
)
− βα |Pk(t− 1)−
α
K |
]
∑Kk=1 exp
[
γ log
(
1+ kK
)
− βα |Pk(t− 1)−
α
K |]
] . (12)
This is nothing but a non-linear map for the probability Pk(t). Hence, one can evalu-
ate the time-evolution of the aggregation probability Pk(0)→Pk(1)→···→Pk(t)→
··· by solving the map (12) recursively from an arbitrary initial condition, say,
P1(0) = P2(0) = · · · = PK(0) = 1/K. In Fig. 1, we plot the time evolution of the
aggregation probability for the lowest ranking company P1(t) (left) and the highest
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Fig. 1 The time evolution of probability for the lowest ranking company P1(t) (left) and the highest
ranking company PK(t) (right). We set K = 50,α = 1 and varied the values of parameters β ,γ .
ranking company PK(t) (right). From this figure, we easily find that the PK(t) os-
cillates for β ≫ γ due to the second term of the energy function (8), namely, the
negative feed back acts on the high-ranking preference term −γ logεk.
When we define the state satisfying P1(t) < ε ≡ 10−5 as a kind of ‘business
failures’, the failure does not take place until γ ≃ 10.3 ≡ γc. However, the failure
emerges the parameter γ reaches the critical value γ = γc.
4 Ranking frozen line
Here we discuss the condition on which the order of probabilities PK(t) > PK−m(t)
is reversed at time t + 1 as PK(1+ 1)< PK−m(t + 1). After simple algebra, we find
the condition explicitly as
log
(
2K
2K−m
)
>
β
γα . (13)
From this condition, we are confirmed that if the strength of market history β is
strong, the condition is satisfied easily, whereas if the ranking factor γ or job offer
ratio α is large, the condition is hard to be satisfied, namely, the ranking of the
highest and m-th highest is ‘frozen’. In Fig. 2, we draw the example. We set K =
50,β/αγ = 0.5. From this figure, we actually find, for example, the highest ranking
company (m = 0) and 45-th highest ranking company (m = 45) cannot be reversed.
5 Global mismatch measurement
We next discuss the global mismatch measurement between students and compa-
nies. For this purpose, we should evaluate ratio of job supply defined as
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Fig. 2 The boundary of frozen ranking. The solid and the broken lines are log(2K/(2K−m)) and
β/γα , respectively. We set K = 50,β/γα = 0.5.
Ω ≡ 1
V
K
∑
k=1
(v∗k −mk) = 1−
1
V
K
∑
k=1
mk. (14)
Here we assumed that the student who gets multiple informal acceptances chooses
the highest ranking company to go, namely, ˜li = argmaxlεlδsil ,1, where the label sil
takes 1 when the student i obtains the informal acceptance from the company l and
it takes 0 if not. Then, the new employees of company k, namely, the number of
students whom the company k obtains is given by mk = ∑Ni=1 sikδk,˜li .
On the other hand, it should be noticed that the number of all newcomers (all
new employees) in the society is given by
K
∑
k=1
mk = N−N
N
∑
i=1
δsi,0 = N(1−U). (15)
From (14) and (15), we have the linear relationship between the unemployment rate
U and the ratio of job supply Ω as
U = αΩ + 1−α. (16)
It should be noted that the location of a single realization (U,Ω) is dependent on
β ,γ and α through the Ω .
Large mismatch is specified by the area in which both U and Ω are large. We plot
the empirical evidence and our result with γ = β = 1 in Fig. 4. We used the empirical
data for the job offer ratio α and we simply set β = γ = 1. We find that qualitative
behaviours for both empirical and theoretical are similar but quantitatively they are
different. This is because we cannot access the information about macroscopic vari-
ables β ,γ and the result might depend on the choice. Estimation for these variables
by using empirical data should be addressed as our future problem.
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Fig. 3 The relationship between U and Ω for the past Japanese labor market for university gradu-
ates. The left panel is empirical evidence provided by ‘Japan-Insight’ by Mizuho Research Institute
(2011). The right panel is obtained by our toy model. We used the empirical data for the job offer
ratio α and set the ‘unobservable’ parameters as β = γ = 1 (equally weights).
6 Aggregation probability at ‘high temperature’
In the previous sections, we investigate the dynamics of Pk(t) as a non-linear map.
We carried out numerical calculations to evaluate the steady state. Here we attempt
to derive the analytic form of the aggregation probability at the steady state by means
of high-temperature expansion for the case of γ,β/α ≪ 1.
6.1 The high temperature expansion
Let us first consider the zero-th approximation. Namely, we shall rewrite the aggre-
gation probability in terms of ex = 1. This immediately reads Z = ∑Kk=1 1 = K and
we have
P(0)k =
1
K
. (17)
This is nothing but ‘random selection’ by students in the high temperature limit
γ,β/α → 0. This is a rather trivial result and this type of procedure should be pro-
ceeded until we obtain non-trivial results.
In order to proceed to carry out our approximation up to the next order P(1)k ,
we first consider the case of P(1)k > α/K. By making use of ex = 1+ x, we obtain
Z = K + γ ∑Kk=1 log(1+ k/K)− (β/α)+β . Hence, if one notices that
K
∑
k=1
log(1+ k/K) = K · 1
K
K
∑
k=1
log(1+ k/K)≃ K
∫ 1
0
log(1+ x)dx = K(2log2− 1)
(18)
holds for for K ≫ 1, the normalization constant Z leads to Z = K(1+2γ log2−γ)−
(β/α)+β . By setting Pk(t) = Pk(t− 1) = P(1)k (steady state), we have
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P(1)k =
1+ γ log(1+ k/K)− βα P
(1)
k +
β
K
Z
. (19)
By solving the above equation with respect to P(1)k , one finally has
P(1)k =
1+ βK + γ log(1+ k/K)
K(1+ 2γ log2− γ)+β . (20)
For the case of P(1)k < α/K, the same argument as the above gives
ˆP(1)k ≡
1− βK + γ log(1+ k/K)
K(1+ 2γ log2− γ)−β . (21)
It should be noted that P(1)k is independent of the job offer ratio α . We also should
notice that P(1)k = ˆP
(1)
k = 1/K = P
(0)
k is recovered by setting β = 0 in the P(1)k . We
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Fig. 4 The first-order approximation P(1)k = Pk at high temperature (left). The right panel shows
the corresponding probability P(vk).
show the result in Fig. 4.
We can proceed to carry out the above approximation systematically by using the
Tayler’s expansion of exponential exp(x). However, unfortunately, when we try to
obtain the second order approximation, we encounter the terms such as ∑k Pk log(1+
k/K). Apparently, it is impossible for us to evaluate this term until we obtain Pk.
Hence, we shall replace Pk in the above expression by the first order solution P
(1)
k .
We also replace (Pk)2 by (P
(1)
k )
2
, and by using the fact
1
K
K
∑
k=1
{log(1+ k/K)}2 ≃
∫ 1
0
{log(1+ x)}2dx = 2{(log2)2− 2log2+ 1} (22)
we obtain P(2)k as
10 H. Chen and J. Inoue
P(2)k(±) =
ψ±+ γ
2
2 {log(1+
k
K )}
2 + β
2
2K2 {1+(
K+β
αB )
2}
β (ψ±∓1)
α +Bγ2Kχ1−
β γ
αB(2Kγχ1 +(K +β )χ2)
(23)
where we defined
χ1 ≡ (log2)2− 2log2+ 1, χ2 ≡ 2log2− 1 (24)
ψ± ≡ γ log(1+ k/K)± (β/K)+ 1, B≡ K{2γ log2− γ + 1}+β . (25)
We also defined P(2)k+ as a solution for Pk > α/K, whereas P
(2)
k− is a solution for
Pk < α/K.
As we saw in the above argument of high-temperature expansion, one can obtain
the higher-order approximation for the aggregation probability Pk systematically.
However, we should bear in mind that the above approximation should be broken
down for γ,β/α ≃ 1.
6.2 Analytic solution for unemployment rate
We next show that one can obtain the analytic solution for the employment rate in
terms of the aggregation probability at high temperature. Here we show the solution
for the first order approximation P(1)k of the aggregation probability, however, the
extension to the higher-order is straightforward.
As we already saw, for Pk = P
(1)
k and Pk > α/K, NPk,NPk(1−Pk)≫ 1, we have
limN→∞ vk/N = Pk. Namely, the probability that the company k obtains vk-entry
sheets is written as P(vk) = δ (vk −NPk)Θ(Pk−α/K)+ δ (vk−N ˆPk)Θ(α/K−Pk).
We should notice that there exists a point k at which Pk = ˆPk = α/K holds.
When we define P(sik = 1|vk) as the probability that student i receives an in-
formal acceptance from the company k which gathered vk-entry sheets from the
students including the student i, the probability P(sik = 1|vk) is given by
P(sik = 1|vk) = P(sik = 1|aik = 1,vk > v∗k)P(aik = 1)Θ(vk− v∗k)
+ P(sik = 1|aik = 1,vk < v∗k)P(aik = 1)Θ(v∗k − vk). (26)
Then, taking into account the fact P(sik = 1|aik = 1,vk > v∗k) = v∗k/vk,P(sik = 1|aik =
1,vk < v∗k) = 1, and P(aik = 1) = Pk, we immediately obtain
P(sik = 1|vk) =
(
v∗k
vk
)
PkΘ(vk− v∗k)+ ˆPkΘ(v∗k − vk). (27)
Obviously, the above P(sik = 1|vk) depends on vk. Hence, we calculate the average
of P(sik = 1|vk) over the probability P(vk), namely P(sik = 1) = ∑vk P(vk)P(sik =
1|vk). Then, we have
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φk ≡ αK Θ(Pk−α/K)+ ˆPkΘ(α/K− ˆPk) (28)
where we canceled the index i because it is no longer dependent on specific student
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Fig. 5 P(sk = 1) ≡ φk evaluated by means of P(1)k .
i and we define φk as the probability that an arbitrary student gets the informal
acceptance from the company k. In Fig. 5, we plot the typical behaviour of the φk.
Therefore, the probability that an arbitrary student who sent three entry sheets
to three companies k, l,m could not get any informal acceptance is given by (1−
φk)(1−φl)(1−φm)/3!. From this observation, we easily conclude that analytic form
of the unemployment rate is obtained as
U =
K
∑
k1<k2<···<ka
(1−φk1) · · · (1−φka)
K(K− 1) · · ·(K− a+ 1)
. (29)
7 Summary
In this paper, we introduced a toy probabilistic model to analyse job-matching pro-
cesses in recent Japanese labor markets for university graduates by means of statis-
tical physics. We succeeded in deriving a non-linear map with respect to the aggre-
gation probability. By analyzing the map and evaluating the steady states by means
of high-temperature expansion, we could discuss several analytic results and their
mathematical properties. Global mismatch between students and companies was
discussed from both empirical and theoretical viewpoints. However, as we saw in
Fig. 4, there still exists a gap between our result and the empirical evidence. To
bridge the gap, we should estimate the non-observable parameters such as γ,β us-
ing the data collected by appropriate questionnaires. It should be addressed as one
of our future studies.
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